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We investigated whether top-down expectations about an actor’s intentions affect action perception in a
representational momentum (RM) paradigm. Participants heard an actor declare an intention to either
take or leave an object and then saw him either reach for or withdraw from it, such that action and inten-
tion were either congruent or incongruent. Observers generally misperceived the hand’s disappearance
point further along the trajectory than it actually was, in line with the idea that action perception
incorporates predictions of the action’s future course. Importantly, this RM effect was larger for actions
congruent with the actor’s goals than for incongruent actions. These results demonstrate that action
prediction integrates both current motion and top-down knowledge about the actor’s intention. They
support recent theories that emphasise the role of prior expectancies and prediction errors in social
(and non-social) cognitive processing.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
One’s predictions of an action’s future course are guided not
only by incoming sensory information but also by prior knowledge
of the actor’s goals. If I said ‘‘I’m thirsty!” while reaching for a mug,
you might predict that I would soon drink from it. However, if I
said ‘‘The mug isn’t safe here” you would make a completely differ-
ent prediction, perhaps to move the mug to a different place. Such
predictions are central to fluent social interactions, allowing peo-
ple to direct attention towards anticipated action goals (Eshuis,
Coventry, & Vulchanova, 2009; Gredeback & Melinder, 2010), to
coordinate joint actions (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009), and to fill in
information missing from perceptual input (eg. Sparenberg,
Springer, & Prinz, 2012). Yet, despite their ubiquity, little is known
of how social predictions come about, and via which mechanisms
they exert such far-reaching effects on behaviour.
Recent hierarchical feedback models of cognition suggest that
predictions themselves are perceptual, and therefore affect all sub-
sequent processes – both motor and cognitive – that depend on
perceptual input (Clark, 2013; Den Ouden, Kok, & De Lange,
2012). In social interactions, people continuously second-guess
others’ intentions, using cues such as nearby objects (Bach,Knoblich, Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 2005; Bach, Nicholson, &
Hudson, 2014), gaze (Becchio, Bertone, & Castiello, 2008; Hudson,
Liu, & Jellema, 2009), emotional expression (Hudson & Jellema,
2011), and inferred mental states (Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis,
2010). In hierarchical feedback models of social perception
(Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007a, 2007b), such inferences do not
remain abstract: instead they are immediately translated into con-
crete behaviour predictions – a thirsty person will drink from a
glass, a cautious person may merely move it – and compared with
sensory input. If there is a match, one’s goal assumptions are con-
firmed. ‘‘Prediction errors”, however, render the mismatching
event more salient and cause re-evaluations of the prior assump-
tions or the perceptual input. Because these processes happen in
sensory processing areas themselves (Coventry, Christophel, Fehr,
Valdés-Conroy, & Herrmann, 2013; Summerfield et al., 2006),
predictions have direct perceptual consequences. Perception, espe-
cially when ambiguous, is biased towards one’s predictions. The
perception of mismatches, however, is enhanced.
Such models are a marked departure from prior work where
observed actions are matched, in a bottom-up manner, to own
motor or goal representations (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010).
Instead, any high-level information about others’ intentions will
directly affect, in a top-down manner, the perception of their
actions, biasing them in the direction of their (predicted) future
course. Here, we test whether others’ action goals have such a
top-down influence. We used the well-established representa-
tional momentum (RM) paradigm (Freyd & Finke, 1984;
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disappears. They then compare the objects’ last position with a
probe stimulus, which is either displaced slightly forward in time
(in an anticipated future position) or backward in time (a previous
position). As predicted by hierarchical feedback models, perceptual
judgements are typically biased towards the immediate future:
Backwards displacements elicit large prediction errors and are
readily detected, whereas equivalent forward displacements,
which are in line with one’s predictions, are perceived as identical
with the object’s last position. The amount of forward bias – the
size of the RM effect – is thus directly related to the strength of
action prediction. Subsequent research has shown that the effect
reflects one’s internal model of future motion, and integrates infor-
mation about the object, its environment, the effect of one’s own
actions, and the physical forces acting on it (Hubbard &
Bharucha, 1988; Jordan & Hunsinger, 2008; Jordan & Knoblich,
2004; Kerzel, Jordan, & Muesseler, 2001; reviewed in Hubbard,
2005). Moreover, because participants are asked to accurately
judge the hand’s disappearance point, the effect reflects automatic,
involuntary effects of motion predictions on perceptual judgments.
Here, we apply this paradigm to social perception and test,
whether top-down knowledge of others’ intention is directly trans-
formed into perceptual action predictions. Any information about
an actor’s intention should then be automatically integrated with
the observed kinematics, and bias perceptual judgments towards
this goal, even when asked to accurately report disappearance
points. Participants watched an actor’s hand either reaching for
or withdrawing from an object, and then judged the hand’s disap-
pearance point relative to probes that were either identical to the
hand’s last seen position, or displaced either forward or backward
to the direction of motion. To manipulate perceived goals, prior to
action onset, the actor declared an intention to either reach for the
object (‘‘I’ll Take It!”) or withdraw from it (‘‘I’ll Leave It!”). If others’
goals are immediately integrated into predictions of their action’s
course, then the match between goal and action should directly
affect motion prediction. RM for reaches toward an object should
increase when the actor has stated that he wished to ‘‘take it” than
‘‘leave it”, and vice versa for withdrawals.Fig. 1. Experimental stimuli and trial sequence. The range of objects is depicted in panel
column. The knife oriented with either the handle (safe) or blade (painful) oriented to the
B. In this example, the hand reached toward the object, which was safe to grasp. The prob
illustrative purposes). It was either the same as the final position of the action sequence (
(farthest from the object). The probe could be displaced by 1 frame or 2 frames (illustrat
were farther from the object and probes displaced backward in time were nearer the obSuch effects would support hierarchical feedback models of
social perception and show that perception itself is influenced by
what we predict others to do, explaining why goal attributions
have such pervasive effects on subsequent attention and behaviour
(Eshuis et al., 2009; Gredeback & Melinder, 2010; Sebanz &
Knoblich, 2009). In the first experiment the intentions were linked
with object type. The actor said ‘‘I’ll Take It” for safe objects and ‘‘I’ll
Leave It” for dangerous objects. The second experiment orthogo-
nally manipulated object and intention to test whether object
types or intention statements gave rise to the effects (i.e. actors
could now say ‘‘I’ll take it” for both painful and safe objects).
Moreover, while in Experiment 1 the utterances of the actors were
task relevant, they were completely irrelevant in Experiment 2 (see
also Supplementary Experiment). While prior work has assessed
how gaze cues (Hudson et al., 2009) and overt instructions to
others (Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, in press) affect
action prediction, this study tests for the first time whether others’
stated intentions are automatically integrated into the perception
of their action.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants (Experiment 1: 35 participants, 23 females, mean
age of 27.7 years, SD = 10.3; Experiment 2: 32 participants, 20
females, mean age of 26.8 years, SD = 9.2), were right handed,
native English speakers, and were recruited from the Plymouth
community. They gave written informed consent and were recom-
pensed with £6. The experiments adhered to the ethical guidelines
of Plymouth University and the ESRC, in accord with the declara-
tion of Helsinki.
2.2. Apparatus
Visual stimuli were filmed using a Canon Legria HFS200 and
edited using MovieDek and Corel Paintshop Pro X6. Audio stimuli
were recorded using a M-Audio Microtrack 2 Digital VoiceA, with safe objects in the left column and the equivalent painful objects in the right
hand is depicted at the bottom. An example of the trial sequence is depicted in panel
e stimulus could be in one of three positions (each superimposed over the other for
centre), displaced forward in time (nearest the object) or displaced backward in time
ed here). For actions withdrawing from the object, probes displaced forward in time
ject. The black background has been changed to grey for illustrative purposes.
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(NeuroBS) on a Viglen DQ67SW computer with a Philips Brilliance
221P3LPY display (resolution: 1920  1080, refresh rate: 60 Hz).
Audio stimuli were delivered using a Logitech PC120 combined
microphone/headphone set.
2.3. Stimuli
2.3.1. Visual stimuli
The stimulus (Fig. 1)was derived fromvideos of a hand starting in
a rest position then reaching for one of four objects on the left (glass,
wine glass, plastic bottle, knife with handle oriented to the hand).
For each reach, a second sequencewas created by digitally replacing
the safe objects with painful objects that were matched for size and
grip type (broken glass, broken wine glass, cactus, knife with blade
oriented towards hand). All background details were replaced with
a uniform black background. The action sequences (.07  .12
degrees visual angle) used in the experiment consisted of 26 frames
of thesemovies and showed the complete transport phase,while the
final graspwas omitted. Each sequencewas either 3 or 5 frames long
and started in the middle of the reach (starting frame randomly
chosen between frames 13 and 17). Reaches and withdrawals were
created by stepping either forwards or backwards through the
sequence (e.g. frame 15–17–19 for reaches, frame 15–13–11 for
withdrawals). Each frame was presented for 80 ms.
2.3.2. Audio stimuli
Two audio stimuli of an actor saying ‘‘I’ll Take It” and ‘‘I’ll Leave
It”, each of 1000 ms duration, were played through the head-
phones, biased 50% to the right to match the actor’s position on
the right of the screen.
2.4. Procedure
Participants sat approximately 60 cm from the computer
screen. Each trial began with a fixation cross followed by a blank
screen (combined duration 1000 ms), followed by the first static
frame of the action sequence, showing a hand near the object. After
a random delay between 1000 ms and 3000 ms, the intention
statement – ‘‘I’ll Take It” or ‘‘I’ll Leave It” – was presented. The
action sequence (grasp or withdrawal) always started 200 ms after
statement offset, creating a causal link between intention state-
ment and action.
After a blank screen (250 ms), the probe stimulus consisting of a
single frame taken from the same action sequence was presented
(4000 ms or until response). It showed the hand in either the same
position as the final frame of the action, displaced forward along
the trajectory (‘‘+”, nearer the object for reaches, farther for
withdrawals), or displaced backward (‘‘”). This displacement of
the forwardandbackwardprobeswas either1 frameor 2 frames for-Video 1. Trial Examples.ward or backward, producing 5 possible probe positions (2,1,0,
+1,+2). Participants pressed the spacebar if they thought the probe
position was different from the hand’s final position, and did not
respond if they thought it was the same. Please see the multimedia
file below (see online) for an example of the trials (see Supplemen-
tary table for trial descriptions).
2.4.1. Experiment 1
Each level of Intention (‘‘I’ll Take It”, ‘‘I’ll Leave It”), Action
Direction (reach, withdrawal), and Probe Direction (2,1,0,+1,
+2) was varied factorially and repeated 8 times (160 trials). The
object was randomly selected on each trial. To ensure that partic-
ipants would process the intention statements, in a further 16 tri-
als the actor stated the wrong intention (‘‘I’ll Take It” for painful
objects, ‘‘I’ll Leave It” for safe objects”). Participants were required
to say ‘‘Stop!” as soon as they detected this mismatch and the trial
ended. Additionally, 16 catch trials were included in which the
probe was displaced by 4 frames from the final position of the
action sequence. These catch trials were used to identify partici-
pants who did not comply with task instructions and were not
analysed further.
2.4.2. Experiment 2
The factors Object Type (safe, painful), Intention (‘‘I’ll Take It”,
‘‘I’ll Leave It”), Action Direction (reach, withdrawal), and Probe
(2,1,0,+1,+2) were varied factorially and repeated 6 times, pro-
ducing 240 trials, in addition to the 16 catch trials in which the
probe was displaced by 4 frames. There were no catch trials in
which the actor uttered an incorrect intention.
2.5. Analysis
RM was measured as the difference between the frequencies
with which backward displaced probes were detected relative to
forward probes. Positive values therefore reflect increased likeli-
hoods of accepting forward displaced hands as ‘‘same” compared
to backwards displacements. While RM has been quantified in var-
ious ways (see Hubbard, 2010, for overview), this measure corre-
sponds to the original approach (Freyd & Finke, 1984), and
provides a straightforward measure of perceived forward displace-
ments, without requiring further assumptions (although identical
results are obtained with alternative measures, e.g. weighted
means, Hayes & Freyd, 2002).
3. Results
Participants were excluded if their ability to detect the catch tri-
als was 1SD less than the mean group accuracy, or when their
accuracy was less than 10% higher than in the experimental trials
(±2,±1), suggesting an insensitivity to even the largest probe differ-
ences. This was the case for eleven participants in Experiment 1
and seven in Experiment 2. However, the results are remarkably
robust to the exclusion criterion, and the results remain significant
even if no participants are excluded (see Supplementary Material).
3.1. Experiment 1
The percentage of trials in which the probe stimulus was
reported as different from the final position of the action sequence
were entered into an ANOVA with Intention (‘‘I’ll Take It” vs. ‘‘I’ll
Leave It”), Action Direction (reach vs. withdrawal), Probe Distance
(2 frames vs. 1 frame), and Probe Direction (forward vs. backward)
as repeated measures factors. It revealed a main effect of Probe
Direction (F(1,23) = 68.6, p < .001, gp2 = .749, 95% CI [20,32]) and
Probe Distance (F(1,23) = 137.4, p < .001, gp2 = .857, 95% CI
Fig. 2. Results for experiments 1 (top) and 2 (bottom). In panel A the proportion of trials in which the participants judged the probe position to be different from the final
position of the action sequence is plotted for each level of the probe stimulus. The proportion of different responses decreases as the displacement of the probe position
decreases. However, the extent of this decrease for probes displaced forward in time (+) and backward in time () was not symmetrical. This representational momentum
effect (backward probe detection – forward probe detection) was significant both when the probe was displaced by 1 frame and 2 frames. The same probes (not analysed) and
displacements by 4 frames (catch trials) are included for illustrative purposes. In panel B the representational momentum effect (proportion of detected backwards minus
forward displacements) is depicted for reaches toward or withdrawals from the object, after the actor had said either ‘‘I’ll Take It” or ‘‘I’ll Leave It”. The size of the
representational momentum effect was larger when the action direction was congruent with the actors intentions (outer bars) than when incongruent (inner bars). Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
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than smaller displacements (±1), and backward displacements
detected more readily than forward displacements (Fig. 2.
Top/Panel A), reflecting the classic RM effect. Importantly, there
was a three-way interaction between Intention, Action Direction
and Probe Direction (F(1,23) = 14.9, p = .001, gp2 = .395, 95% CI
[10,30]), showing that RM (detected backwards displacements
minus detected forward displacements) depended on the congru-
ency of action and intention. This three-way interaction is depicted
in Fig. 2, Top/Panel B, with the Probe Direction factor already
resolved to show the size of the RM effect. It illustrates that the
RM effect was greater when the action was congruent with the
intention than when it was incongruent. There were no further
main effects or interactions (Fs < 2.22).
In a further experiment (see Supplementary Material) we repli-
cated these results when the stated intentions were task irrelevant.
Identical effects were observed, demonstrating that intentions
affect RM automatically.
3.2. Experiment 2
Data were analysed with the same ANOVAmodel as Experiment
1, with Object Type (painful vs. safe) as an additional repeatedmeasures factor. There again was a significant RM effect (Probe
Direction: F(1,24) = 53.3, p < .001, gp2 = .690, 95% CI [20,35]), and
probes displaced by 2 frames were more readily detected than 1
frame displacements (Probe Distance: F(1,24) = 89.0, p < .001,
gp2 = .788, 95% CI [18,28]). The RM effect was marginally larger
for probes displaced by 2 frames than 1 frame (Probe Direc-
tion  Probe Distance: F(1,24) = 4.21, p = .051, gp2 = .149, 95% CI
[0,15]). Importantly, as in Experiment 1, there was a three-way
interaction of Intention, Action Direction and Probe Direction
(F(1,24) = 7.62, p = .011, gp2 = .241, 95% CI [4,21]). Actions congru-
ent with the intention elicited larger RM than incongruent actions
(Fig. 2, Bottom/Panel B). There were no further main effects or
interactions. In particular, no effects were qualified by Object Type
(all Fs < 2.1).
4. Discussion
As predicted, observers consistently overestimated the amount
of perceived motion in others’ actions, such that probes further
along the trajectory were seen as indistinguishable from the hand’s
last position. This RM effect confirms that perception of actions –
like that of moving objects – is biased towards the future and
anticipates their further course. Importantly, we show that this
M. Hudson et al. / Cognition 146 (2016) 245–250 249bias is driven, at least in part, by prior knowledge of the actor’s
intention. Stated intentions to reach for an object (‘‘I’ll Take It”)
increased RM for movements towards it. In contrast, intentions
to withdraw (‘‘I’ll Leave It”) increased RM for movements away.
This was evident even when the statements were completely task
irrelevant, and independent of object type, revealing for the first
time an involuntary integration of low-level motion and inferences
about the actor’s goals.
Such direct effects of inferred intentions are problematic for
models assuming primarily bottom-up action recognition mecha-
nisms (e.g., based on one’s motor experience, Rizzolatti &
Sinigaglia, 2010). Instead, they suggest that such pathways are, at
the very least, accompanied by parallel top-down mechanisms
(cf. Gredeback & Melinder, 2010). They specifically support the
proposal that top-down knowledge about the actor’s goals is con-
stantly integrated, in a Bayesian manner, with sensory motion
information (cf. Kilner et al., 2007a, 2007b). When goal and motion
are in line, displacements against these predictions (backward
probes) elicit large prediction errors while displacements towards
one’s predictions (forward probes) remain undetected. For incon-
gruent actions and goals, however, forward and backward probes
are more equivocal, and RM is reduced.
Prior work on predictive coding has focussed on the motion of
abstract stimuli, stimulus likelihoods (e.g. Hubbard & Bharucha,
1988; Summerfield et al., 2006), and the anticipated effects of one’s
own actions (Jordan & Hunsinger, 2008; Jordan & Knoblich, 2004;
for a review see, Hubbard, 2005). Our finding that high-level
knowledge of others’ intentions directly biases action perception,
even affecting the perception of low-level action kinematics,
reveals that very similar mechanisms govern social perception.
Such top-down views of social perception (Brown & Brune, 2012;
Csibra, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007a, 2007b; Koster-Hale & Saxe,
2013; Teufel et al., 2010) have the potential to unify several find-
ings and theoretical approaches. First, while such models assume
that inferred intentions are directly translated into action predic-
tions, there is disagreement about the underlying processes, with
some assuming a perceptual or abstract/cognitive mediation
(Gredeback & Melinder, 2010; Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & Perrett,
2000; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004), and others
implicating motor/action planning processes (Jordan, 2009;
Jordan & Hunsinger, 2008; Keysers & Gazzola, 2014; Kilner et al.,
2007a, 2007b). Our paradigm is ideally suited to disentangle these
possibilities, by testing, for example, whether similar perceptual
biases are induced by either low-level motion stimuli (suggesting
a perceptual mediation) or overt motor actions of the participants
(suggesting a motoric mediation). Second, humans infer others’
goal from various cues, such as gaze and emotional expression
(Hudson & Jellema, 2011; Hudson et al., 2009), prior behaviour
(Joyce, Schenke, Bayliss, & Bach, 2015; Tipper & Bach, 2011),
objects and context (e.g. Bach, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2011; Bach
et al., 2014; Iacoboni et al., 2005), or action kinematics (Manera,
Becchio, Cavallo, Sartori, & Castiello, 2011). Our results specify a
common top-down pathway via which such goal inferences affect
subsequent processing. By influencing perception, predictions act
as an entry mechanism by which one’s own behaviour (e.g.,
actions, Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009; gaze/attention, Eshuis et al.,
2009; Gredeback & Melinder, 2010) can be guided by one’s infer-
ences about others.Acknowledgments
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